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Grenfell Tower fire as a consequence of the failure of government
One of the key functions of the state is to protect its citizens. Understandably much of 
the debate in the General Election focused on protection of citizens from terrorists. 
This was perhaps understandable given the series of terrorist attacks, but this diverted 
attention from the no less important duty of the state to ensure a safe, secure and 
decent quality of life for all its citizens.  An inferno in a publicly owned housing 
block which housed lower income households represents an acute failure of 
government at all levels. As the facts of the case are subject to a major enquiry and 
new information is emerging on an hourly basis, and as we still do not know whether 
the death toll is 20 or 100, it is difficult to write in an informed and rational manner 
and premature to attribute blame. Thousands of words have already been written in 
the press. Residents who have lost their homes and possessions and in many cases 
their relatives and friends are justified in their anger and the need to seek justice and 
redress. It is unlikely that we will see any of the parties involved admitting 
responsibility for the disaster and certainly the case for demonstrating gross 
negligence in terms of a corporate manslaughter charge will be doubt be subject to 
legal disputes for many months and possibly many years to come.
What is evident however is that for several decades no government has focused 
sufficiently on the need to provide good quality, safe and secure homes for lower 
income households.  So far as Governments have considered housing at all, the focus 
has been on market led supply for prospective homeowners. Only in recent months, in 
the last Government’s Housing White Paper, did we see any recognition of the need 
for additional rented housing. While it should be acknowledged that the last Labour 
Government invested in the Decent Homes programme for improving existing council 
housing, it is perhaps open to question whether the focus of this programme was 
correct, given that the programme did not apparently give sufficient attention to 
protection from fire. In recent years, we have seen an emphasis on redeveloping 
estates to provide high density flats for the private market, rather than improving the 
homes of council tenants and leaseholders who live there – a programme driven 
mainly by the needs to maximise asset values rather than any assessment of the 
relative housing needs of different groups.
Government policy has been increasingly to leave decisions on housing provision and 
the maintenance and improvement of existing housing to local councils. Some 
councils transferred their stock to housing associations; others set up ‘arms length’ 
housing organisations to manage their stock. The separation of the management of the 
stock form the local authority’s statutory housing and homelessness duties was in fact 
promoted by the Labour government. I never understood the logic of this proposition. 
It weakened the local authority’s ability to deliver its statutory responsibilities, while 
at the same time leaving confusion, at least in terms of the perspective of tenants, as to 
the division of responsibilities between the owner of the housing ( the local authority) 
and the managing body. Elected councillors could offload responsibility by referring 
complainants to the managing organisation – something many councillors were 
relieved to be able to do. It is perhaps ironic that in Kensington and Chelsea, the Arms 
Length Management Organisation (ALMO) was actually constituted as a Tenant 
Management Organisation (TMO) but appears not to have been led by the tenants in 
terms of providing an adequate response to the concerns of the tenants living in 
Grenfell Tower. This raises major concerns, some of which are not new, about the 
accountability structures within such organisations.
There are clear concerns as to the nature of refurbishment programmes and the 
conflict between competing objectives. The refurbishment programme for Grenfell 
Tower and for similar blocks in other boroughs does not appear to be primarily about 
upgrading the facilities and securing the structure of the block.  Cladding was justified 
in terms of increasing energy efficiency but also in terms of improving the external 
appearance of the block a common practice for 1970’s concrete blocks which were 
appearing worn. There is clearly a question as to whether cladding actually 
compromised the soundness of the original structure of the block and there is 
considerable expert advice that this was the case, notably in terms of the 
combustibility of the material used. A number of expert reports have argued for 
revising the Building Regulations, notably following the report of the inquiry into the 
Lakanal fire in Southwark. The fact that that fire was eight years ago and building 
regulations have still not been updated demonstrates the complete failure of 
Government to learn the lessons from previous disasters and take speedy corrective 
action. To learn that the US banned use of certain cladding materials  in 2012 and the 
manufacturer of panels sells two version on panels, one more combustible than the 
other, so the  building company and council chose the cheaper more combustible 
version ( if this actually correct) demonstrates firstly that we need tougher building 
regulations and secondly that issues of cost and energy efficiency are perhaps 
secondary to issues of basic health and safety, which is supposed to be a central 
objective of building regulations. Concerns about the approach to refurbishment are 
not new – not only did the Grenfell residents raise concerns, as did members of the 
TMO board and individual councillors, but it appears that the London Fire Brigade 
actually wrote all boroughs as recently as April advising them of their concerns on the 
use of cladding panels. There are no doubt other councils undertaking checks, but 
why was this no done after the Lakanal fire?
The fire is rightly raising the issue of why build tower blocks at all. After the Ronan 
Point disaster in 1968 , and following changes in the subsidy system, councils 
generally stopped building high rise. Having families living in social housing above 
the fifth floor was actually a measure of deprivation with the national index of 
multiple deprivation which generated additional central government funding for local 
authorities. Many councils in the 1970’s and 1980’s, notably in East London, had 
programmes of demolishing towers and rehousing the tenants in low and middle rise 
housing.  Other councils moved families out of upper floors and relets flats to singles 
under ‘ hard to let’ schemes. Kensington and Chelsea however kept some of its high 
rise blocks and in fact Grenfell was started in 1972 completed in 1974 – 6 years after 
the Ronan Point explosion. In some cases blocks were modified to include concierge 
schemes to seek to improve management and security. 
However, in recent years, successive Mayors and many boroughs, have encouraged 
the development of new high rise residential blocks, primarily for the home 
ownership market, though in some cases primarily for the investment market rather 
than for occupation – the argument being that safety standards are now improved and 
that home owners are less likely to case management problems than tenants – that 
problems with tower block living were primarily related to occupants rather than the 
structures. Interestingly the current Mayor of London, Sadiq Khan, like his 
predecessors an enthusiast for densification, is currently considering reviewing the 
density policy which in theory seeks  to constrain over-development ( though in 
practice it has failed to do so), to allow  schemes with higher densities, and has 
published a research report considering the impact of density on quality of life and 
residents perceptions. Previous fires and other ‘ incidents’ such as a helicopter 
crashing into the Vauxhall Tower, have not led to any review of Mayoral policy on 
high rise buildings, policy in the past being solely driven by the relationship of high 
rise buildings to views of or from historic locations. Perhaps this time the lesson will 
be learnt : We must stop wrapping existing towers in flammable plastic by making it 
illegal; We should  stop giving planning consent to high rise developments which are 
not compliant with planning policy on density, affordable housing and bedroom size 
mix. We should rehouse all families, all elderly people and other vulnerable people 
into lower rise housing – we did this in many councils in the 1980’s and if we build 
more lower rise affordable homes, we can do it again. 
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